For how long to tie your hands? Stable relationships in an unstable environment

DOI10.1007/s00712-008-0029-8zbMath1161.91315OpenAlexW2014899354MaRDI QIDQ1018033

Ferdinando Colombo, Guido Merzoni

Publication date: 13 May 2009

Published in: Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-008-0029-8

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (1)

On the value of partial commitment for cooperative investment in buyer-supplier relationship

Cites Work

• Predation, reputation, and entry deterrence
• Reputation and imperfect information
• The interaction of implicit and explicit contracts in repeated agency
• Rational Expectations and Policy Credibility Following a Change in Regime
• A Representation Theorem for "Preference for Flexibility"
• Monitoring Cooperative Agreements in a Repeated Principal-Agent Relationship
• Golden Eggs and Hyperbolic Discounting
• Temptation and Self-Control
• Optimal Length of Labor Contracts
• Commitment vs. Flexibility
• On the Value of Commitment with Asymmetric Information

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