Union-oligopoly bargaining and entry deterrence: a reassessment of limit pricing

DOI10.1007/S00712-008-0030-2zbMath1161.91377OpenAlexW2025673253MaRDI QIDQ1018034

Rupayan Pal, Bibhas Chandra Saha

Publication date: 13 May 2009

Published in: Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www.esocialsciences.org/Download/repecDownload.aspx?fname=Document1622008520.7070429.pdf&fcategory=Articles&AId=1375&fref=repec

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (3)

Decentralized union-oligopoly bargaining when wages signal strength ⋮ Validity of the ``principle of maximum product differentiation in a unionized mixed-duopoly ⋮ Union-oligopoly bargaining and entry deterrence: a reassessment of limit pricing

Cites Work

• Union-oligopoly bargaining and entry deterrence: a reassessment of limit pricing
• The codetermined firm in oligopoly
• Limit Pricing when the Potential Entrant is Uncertain of its Cost Function
• Limit Pricing and Entry under Incomplete Information: An Equilibrium Analysis
• Can Labor Regulation Hinder Economic Performance? Evidence from India

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