Truthful mechanisms for two-range-values variant of unrelated scheduling

DOI10.1016/j.tcs.2009.02.001zbMath1191.68877OpenAlexW2060824497MaRDI QIDQ1019737

Chang-Yuan Yu

Publication date: 28 May 2009

Published in: Theoretical Computer Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tcs.2009.02.001

zbMATH Keywords

schedulingapproximation algorithmtruthful mechanism

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Approximation algorithms (68W25)

Related Items (6)

The VCG Mechanism for Bayesian Scheduling ⋮ Setting lower bounds on truthfulness ⋮ A lower bound of \(1+\varphi \) for truthful scheduling mechanisms ⋮ Average-case approximation ratio of scheduling without payments ⋮ No truthful mechanism can be better than \(n\) approximate for two natural problems ⋮ A new lower bound for deterministic truthful scheduling

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