A possible conflict between economic efficiency and political pressure

DOI10.1007/S10614-005-6869-1zbMath1161.91465OpenAlexW1978329512MaRDI QIDQ1020523

Phil Simmons, Oscar J. Cacho

Publication date: 29 May 2009

Published in: Computational Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10614-005-6869-1

zbMATH Keywords

evolutionary algorithmpollution taxPigouvian taxpolitical preferences

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) Group preferences (91B10) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Cites Work

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