Voice matters in a dictator game

DOI10.1007/S10683-007-9168-YzbMath1161.91351OpenAlexW2103682712MaRDI QIDQ1020586

Toshiji Kawagoe, Akihiko Matsui, Tetsuo Yamamori, Kazuhiko Kato

Publication date: 29 May 2009

Published in: Experimental Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s10683-007-9168-y

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Experimental studies (91A90)

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Cites Work

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• Social influence in the sequential dictator game
• The hot versus cold effect in a simple bargaining experiment
• Hot vs. cold: Sequential responses and preference stability in experimental games
• Sequential decision and strategy vector methods in ultimatum bargaining: evidence on the strength of other-regarding behavior
• Strategic Information Transmission

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