Time is money: The effect of clock speed on seller's revenue in Dutch auctions

DOI10.1007/S10683-007-9169-XzbMath1161.91371OpenAlexW3124900338WikidataQ55922605 ScholiaQ55922605MaRDI QIDQ1020588

Anthony M. Kwasnica, Elena Katok

Publication date: 29 May 2009

Published in: Experimental Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-007-9169-x

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (7)

Framing the first-price auction ⋮ Spite vs. risk: explaining overbidding in the second-price all-pay auction. A theoretical and experimental investigation ⋮ Design of discrete Dutch auctions with consideration of time ⋮ Behavioral mechanism design: evidence from the modified first-price auctions ⋮ Information acquisition during a descending auction ⋮ Time is money: The effect of clock speed on seller's revenue in Dutch auctions ⋮ Dutch vs. first-price auctions with expectations-based loss-averse bidders

Uses Software

• Z-Tree

Cites Work

• Time is money: The effect of clock speed on seller's revenue in Dutch auctions
• Slow Dutch Auctions
• The Effect of Regret on Optimal Bidding in Auctions
• Optimal auctions revisited

This page was built for publication: Time is money: The effect of clock speed on seller's revenue in Dutch auctions