Fundamentals of simple games from a viewpoint of blockability relations

DOI10.1016/j.amc.2008.12.069zbMath1161.91327OpenAlexW2047235116MaRDI QIDQ1021485

Keitarou Ishikawa

Publication date: 8 June 2009

Published in: Applied Mathematics and Computation (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.amc.2008.12.069

zbMATH Keywords

game theorycoalitiongroup decision makingsimple gamesblockability relation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Group preferences (91B10) Decision theory for games (91A35)

Related Items (2)

Computing Banzhaf-Coleman and Shapley-Shubik power indices with incompatible players ⋮ Computation of several power indices by generating functions

Cites Work

• A note on voting
• New interpretation of the core of simple games in terms of voters' permission.
• A method to compare influence of coalitions on group decision other than desirability relation
• A characterization of completeness of blockability relations with respect to unanimity
• Comparability of coalitions in committees with permission of voters by using desirability relation with hopefulness relation.
• Symmetry of simple games and permission of voters.
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