Bargaining over bets

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2008.06.001zbMath1161.91366OpenAlexW2042415191MaRDI QIDQ1021585

Kfir Eliaz, Ran Spiegler

Publication date: 8 June 2009

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2008.06.001

zbMATH Keywords

mechanism designoptimismspeculative tradebetsnon-common priorspre-game contracts

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (3)

Do sellers exploit biased beliefs of buyers? An experiment ⋮ On efficient partnership dissolution under ex post individual rationality ⋮ Optimal speculative trade among large traders

Cites Work

• Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
• Partnerships, lemons, and efficient trade.
• Cournot competition, forward markets and efficiency
• Optimal Dissent in Organizations
• Dissolving a Partnership Efficiently
• Property Rights and Efficiency of Voluntary Bargaining under Asymmetric Information
• Wishful Thinking in Strategic Environments
• A Mechanism-Design Approach to Speculative Trade
• Contracting with Diversely Naive Agents
• Endogenous Games and Mechanisms: Side Payments Among Players

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