Equilibrium refinement vs. level-\(k\) analysis: An experimental study of cheap-talk games with private information
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Publication:1021596
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2008.04.008zbMath1161.91339OpenAlexW4235410568MaRDI QIDQ1021596
Toshiji Kawagoe, Hirokazu Takizawa
Publication date: 8 June 2009
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2008.04.008
Economics of information (91B44) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Experimental studies (91A90)
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