Growth of strategy sets, entropy, and nonstationary bounded recall

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2008.04.005zbMath1161.91326OpenAlexW2094347179MaRDI QIDQ1021606

Daijiro Okada, Abraham Neyman

Publication date: 8 June 2009

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www.sas.rutgers.edu/virtual/snde/wp/2005-14.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

entropyrepeated gamesbounded rationalitystrategic complexitynonstationary bounded recallstrategy set growth

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (6)

The complexity of interacting automata ⋮ Correlation through bounded recall strategies ⋮ Limits of correlation in repeated games with bounded memory ⋮ The strategic value of recall ⋮ Playing off-line games with bounded rationality ⋮ Should I remember more than you? Best responses to factored strategies

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• How to play with a biased coin?
• Repeated games with bounded entropy
• Optimal Use of Communication Resources
• Probability Inequalities for Sums of Bounded Random Variables

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