Strategic basins of attraction, the path dominance core, and network formation games

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2008.05.003zbMath1161.91334OpenAlexW3122362869MaRDI QIDQ1021609

Frank H. jun. Page, Myrna Holtz Wooders

Publication date: 8 June 2009

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://caepr.indiana.edu/RePEc/inu/caeprp/CAEPR2007-020.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

stable setsbasins of attractionnetwork formation gamesNash networkspath dominance corecoalitions in networksrules of network formation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social networks; opinion dynamics (91D30) Cooperative games (91A12) Games involving graphs (91A43) Group preferences (91B10)

Related Items (36)

Bargaining in endogenous trading networks ⋮ Network formation with myopic and farsighted players ⋮ Contractually stable networks ⋮ Coalition-proof stable networks ⋮ Stable sets in matching problems with coalitional sovereignty and path dominance ⋮ Stability properties of the core in a generalized assignment problem ⋮ Horizon-\(K\) farsightedness in criminal networks ⋮ Constitutions and groups ⋮ Social rationalizability with mediation ⋮ Limited farsightedness in R\&D network formation ⋮ Layered networks, equilibrium dynamics, and stable coalitions ⋮ Correction to: ``Layered networks, equilibrium dynamics, and stable coalitions ⋮ Designing rotation programs: limits and possibilities ⋮ Myopic-farsighted absorbing networks ⋮ The farsighted core in a political game with asymmetric information ⋮ Identity and fragmentation in networks ⋮ Matching with myopic and farsighted players ⋮ Dominance invariant one-to-one matching problems ⋮ Cooperative Games (Von Neumann-Morgenstern Stable Sets) ⋮ Networks and Stability ⋮ Sharing market access in buyer-seller networks ⋮ Myopic and farsighted stability in network formation games: an experimental study ⋮ Single-payoff farsighted stable sets in strategic games with dominant punishment strategies ⋮ Risk-sharing networks and farsighted stability ⋮ Club networks with multiple memberships and noncooperative stability ⋮ Cautious farsighted stability in network formation games with streams of payoffs ⋮ An allocation rule for dynamic random network formation processes ⋮ Bounded budget connection (BBC) games or how to make friends and influence people, on a budget ⋮ The Myopic Stable Set for Social Environments ⋮ Farsightedly stable networks ⋮ Stability of networks under horizon-\(K\) farsightedness ⋮ Coordination on networks with farsighted and myopic agents ⋮ Link investment substitutability: a factor influencing network formation ⋮ Maximin, minimax, and von Neumann-Morgenstern farsighted stable sets ⋮ A characterization of farsightedly stable networks ⋮ Coalition formation among farsighted agents

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