Random assignment under weak preferences

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2008.04.017zbMath1161.91346OpenAlexW2039211950MaRDI QIDQ1021614

Özgür Yılmaz

Publication date: 8 June 2009

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://cdm21054.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/ref/collection/IR/id/6207

zbMATH Keywords

random assignmentordinal efficiencyparametric maximum flow algorithmno justified-envy

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Discrete location and assignment (90B80) Individual preferences (91B08) Matching models (91B68)

Related Items (13)

A graph theoretic approach to the slot allocation problem ⋮ Probabilistic assignment: an extension approach ⋮ Constrained random matching ⋮ The object allocation problem with random priorities ⋮ Random assignments with uniform preferences: an impossibility result ⋮ Impossibilities for probabilistic assignment ⋮ House allocation with fractional endowments ⋮ Assigning agents to a line ⋮ When is the probabilistic serial assignment uniquely efficient and envy-free? ⋮ Kidney exchange: an egalitarian mechanism ⋮ The probabilistic serial mechanism with private endowments ⋮ Exchange of indivisible goods and indifferences: the top trading absorbing sets mechanisms ⋮ Short trading cycles: paired kidney exchange with strict ordinal preferences

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