Sequential coalition formation and the core in the presence of externalities

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2008.04.002zbMath1163.91311OpenAlexW2238597668MaRDI QIDQ1021615

László Á. Kóczy

Publication date: 8 June 2009

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://cris.maastrichtuniversity.nl/en/publications/c574542c-881f-41c8-b79e-d000f8730667

zbMATH Keywords

coreexternalitiessequential coalition formationorder-independent equilibria

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items (10)

Traffic routing oligopoly ⋮ Efficiency and stability in electrical power transmission networks: a partition function form approach ⋮ Population monotonic allocation schemes for games with externalities ⋮ The Nash bargaining solution in general \(n\)-person cooperative games ⋮ Stationary consistent equilibrium coalition structures constitute the recursive core ⋮ Coalition formation in games with externalities ⋮ The projective core of symmetric games with externalities ⋮ A noncooperative bargaining game with endogenous protocol and partial breakdown ⋮ Core-stability over networks with widespread externalities ⋮ The recursive core for non-superadditive games

Cites Work

• Implementation of the recursive core for partition function form games
• A recursive core for partition function form games
• On coalition formation: A game-theoretical approach
• A simple noncooperative core story
• Consistent solutions for cooperative games with externalities.
• Sequential formation of coalitions in games with externalities and fixed payoff division
• Order independent equilibria
• A Noncooperative View of Coalition Formation and the Core
• A Noncooperative Theory of Coalitional Bargaining

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