Sequential coalition formation and the core in the presence of externalities
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Publication:1021615
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2008.04.002zbMath1163.91311OpenAlexW2238597668MaRDI QIDQ1021615
Publication date: 8 June 2009
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://cris.maastrichtuniversity.nl/en/publications/c574542c-881f-41c8-b79e-d000f8730667
Related Items (10)
Traffic routing oligopoly ⋮ Efficiency and stability in electrical power transmission networks: a partition function form approach ⋮ Population monotonic allocation schemes for games with externalities ⋮ The Nash bargaining solution in general \(n\)-person cooperative games ⋮ Stationary consistent equilibrium coalition structures constitute the recursive core ⋮ Coalition formation in games with externalities ⋮ The projective core of symmetric games with externalities ⋮ A noncooperative bargaining game with endogenous protocol and partial breakdown ⋮ Core-stability over networks with widespread externalities ⋮ The recursive core for non-superadditive games
Cites Work
- Implementation of the recursive core for partition function form games
- A recursive core for partition function form games
- On coalition formation: A game-theoretical approach
- A simple noncooperative core story
- Consistent solutions for cooperative games with externalities.
- Sequential formation of coalitions in games with externalities and fixed payoff division
- Order independent equilibria
- A Noncooperative View of Coalition Formation and the Core
- A Noncooperative Theory of Coalitional Bargaining
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