Non-existence of equilibrium in Vickrey, second-price, and English auctions
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Publication:1022381
DOI10.1007/s10058-008-0059-2zbMath1162.91359OpenAlexW2034586660MaRDI QIDQ1022381
Publication date: 22 June 2009
Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://authors.library.caltech.edu/79765/
Related Items (12)
On the existence of Nash equilibrium in discontinuous games ⋮ Information revelation in auctions with common and private values ⋮ Optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective ⋮ Information concentration in common value environments ⋮ Knowing your opponents: information disclosure and auction design ⋮ Distinguishing incentive from selection effects in auction-determined contracts ⋮ On the existence of ideal Nash equilibria in discontinuous games with infinite criteria ⋮ Auctions with both common-value and private-value bidders ⋮ On the existence of equilibria in games with arbitrary strategy spaces and preferences ⋮ On the Existence of Nash Equilibrium in Bayesian Games ⋮ An ascending auction with multi-dimensional signals ⋮ Non-existence of equilibria in simultaneous auctions with a common budget-constraint
Cites Work
- Discontinuous Games and Endogenous Sharing Rules
- Rational Expectations, Information Acquisition, and Competitive Bidding
- A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
- Equilibrium in Sealed High Bid Auctions
- On the Existence of Pure and Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibria in Discontinuous Games
- Single Crossing Properties and the Existence of Pure Strategy Equilibria in Games of Incomplete Information
- Existence of Equilibrium in Single and Double Private Value Auctions1
- Isotone Equilibrium in Games of Incomplete Information
- Communication and Equilibrium in Discontinuous Games of Incomplete Information
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