Inefficiency and complementarity in sharing games

DOI10.1007/s10058-008-0065-4zbMath1165.91307OpenAlexW2117938753MaRDI QIDQ1022382

Thomas Marschak, Dennis Courtney

Publication date: 22 June 2009

Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-008-0065-4

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

(n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Public goods (91B18) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Related Items (1)

Technical Change and the Decentralization Penalty

Cites Work

• Implementing coordinated team play
• Potential games
• Sharing rules in teams.
• Efficient and Nearly-Efficient Partnerships
• Optimal Incentive Schemes with Many Agents

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