Strategic analysis of petty corruption with an intermediary

DOI10.1007/s10058-008-0068-1zbMath1165.91326OpenAlexW1977263932MaRDI QIDQ1022384

Roy Radner, Ariane Lambert-Mogiliansky, Mukul K. Majumdar

Publication date: 22 June 2009

Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://cae.economics.cornell.edu/08-11.pdf

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Dynamic games (91A25) Models of societies, social and urban evolution (91D10)

Related Items (2)

Petty corruption ⋮ Mean-field-game model of corruption

This page was built for publication: Strategic analysis of petty corruption with an intermediary