The human side of mechanism design: a tribute to Leo Hurwicz and Jean-Jacque Laffont
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Publication:1022388
DOI10.1007/s10058-009-0075-xzbMath1162.91456OpenAlexW2141352119MaRDI QIDQ1022388
Publication date: 22 June 2009
Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-009-0075-x
Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Consumer behavior, demand theory (91B42)
Related Items (6)
Suboptimal behavior in strategy-proof mechanisms: evidence from the residency match ⋮ Behavioral mechanism design: evidence from the modified first-price auctions ⋮ Rationality in games and institutions ⋮ Material interests, moral reputation, and crowding out species protection on private land ⋮ Structural measurement errors in nonseparable models ⋮ Economic juries and public project provision
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