The human side of mechanism design: a tribute to Leo Hurwicz and Jean-Jacque Laffont

DOI10.1007/s10058-009-0075-xzbMath1162.91456OpenAlexW2141352119MaRDI QIDQ1022388

Daniel McFadden

Publication date: 22 June 2009

Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-009-0075-x

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Consumer behavior, demand theory (91B42)

Related Items (6)

Suboptimal behavior in strategy-proof mechanisms: evidence from the residency match ⋮ Behavioral mechanism design: evidence from the modified first-price auctions ⋮ Rationality in games and institutions ⋮ Material interests, moral reputation, and crowding out species protection on private land ⋮ Structural measurement errors in nonseparable models ⋮ Economic juries and public project provision

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• Measurement errors: A principal investigator-agent approach
• Combining sources of preference data
• The effects of financial incentives in experiments: A review and capital-labor-production framework. (With commentaries)
• Economic preferences or attitude expressions?: An analysis of dollar responses to public issues. (With commentaries)
• Financing Public Goods by Means of Lotteries
• Using Elasticities to Derive Optimal Income Tax Rates
• Nash Implementation Using Undominated Strategies
• Partially Verifiable Information and Mechanism Design
• Justifying the First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems
• The Existence of Efficient and Incentive Compatible Equilibria with Public Goods
• An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem
• Nonparametric and Districtuion-Free Estimation of the Binary Threshold Crossing and The Binary Choice Models
• A Stochastic Decentralized Resource Allocation Process: Part I
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Optimal Allocation of Public Goods: A Solution to the "Free Rider" Problem
• Characterization of Satisfactory Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preferences for Public Goods
• Sample Selection Bias as a Specification Error
• A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation
• Voting and Lottery Drafts as Efficient Public Goods Mechanisms
• Repeated Play, Cooperation and Coordination: An Experimental Study
• Data Markets and the Production of Surveys
• Does Market Experience Eliminate Market Anomalies?
• Nonparametric Identification under Discrete Variation
• Confidence Intervals for Partially Identified Parameters
• An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation
• On Producer Taxation
• Existence of Equilibrium of Plans, Prices, and Price Expectations in a Sequence of Markets
• Application to the valuation of the environment

This page was built for publication: The human side of mechanism design: a tribute to Leo Hurwicz and Jean-Jacque Laffont