Efficiency of atomic splittable selfish routing with polynomial cost functions

DOI10.1007/s11067-007-9017-8zbMath1162.90360OpenAlexW1989955802WikidataQ59297175 ScholiaQ59297175MaRDI QIDQ1024062

Hong Kam Lo, Deren Han, Hai Yang

Publication date: 16 June 2009

Published in: Networks and Spatial Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11067-007-9017-8

zbMATH Keywords

networkequilibriumprice of anarchyselfish routingsystem optimum

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Deterministic network models in operations research (90B10) General equilibrium theory (91B50)

Related Items (7)

Self-fulfilling signal of an endogenous state in network congestion games ⋮ Congestion control for a system with parallel stations and homogeneous customers using priority passes ⋮ Inefficiency of logit-based stochastic user equilibrium in a traffic network under ATIS ⋮ Bounding the inefficiency of the C-logit stochastic user equilibrium assignment ⋮ The price of anarchy in nonatomic consumption-relevance congestion games ⋮ Bounding the inefficiency of logit-based stochastic user equilibrium ⋮ A mixed traffic assignment problem and its upper bound of efficiency loss

Cites Work

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• The price of anarchy for non-atomic congestion games with symmetric cost maps and elastic demands.
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• How bad is selfish routing?
• On the Inefficiency of Equilibria in Congestion Games
• On the relationship between Nash—Cournot and Wardrop equilibria
• Multiple Equilibrium Behaviors on Networks
• Algorithms, games, and the internet
• Competitive routing in networks with polynomial costs
• Selfish Routing in Capacitated Networks
• Integer Programming and Combinatorial Optimization
• The Price of Routing Unsplittable Flow
• The price of anarchy is independent of the network topology

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