On background: using two-argument chance

DOI10.1007/s11229-007-9271-9zbMath1168.03307OpenAlexW1996367386MaRDI QIDQ1024146

Kevin Nelson

Publication date: 16 June 2009

Published in: Synthese (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-007-9271-9

zbMATH Keywords

conditional probabilityobjective Bayesianismprincipal principledirect inference

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Philosophical and critical aspects of logic and foundations (03A05) Probability and inductive logic (03B48) Axioms; other general questions in probability (60A05)

Cites Work

• Against conditionalization
• What conditional probability could not be
• Who's afraid of undermining? Why the principal principle might not contradict Humean supervenience
• Statistical Evidence
• Conditionalizing on Knowledge
• Chance, Credence, and the Principal Principle
• Subjective Probability
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