Potential, value, and coalition formation

DOI10.1007/s11750-007-0035-yzbMath1163.91312OpenAlexW2048708133MaRDI QIDQ1024697

Annick Laruelle, Federico Valenciano

Publication date: 17 June 2009

Published in: Top (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11750-007-0035-y

zbMATH Keywords

potentialvalueprobabilistic modelscoalitional games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items

A cooperative value in a multiplicative model ⋮ The prediction value

Cites Work

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