Reelection threshold contracts in politics

DOI10.1007/S00355-007-0277-5zbMath1163.91340OpenAlexW3124881591MaRDI QIDQ1024768

Hans Gersbach, Verena Liessem

Publication date: 17 June 2009

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11850/3661

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) History, political science (91F10)

Related Items (2)

Multiple tasks and political organization ⋮ Electoral competition, incentive contracts for politicians and unknown preferences

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Optimal retention in agency problems
• Electoral competition, incentive contracts for politicians and unknown preferences
• Redesigning Democracy

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