Iterative elimination of weakly dominated strategies in binary voting agendas with sequential voting

DOI10.1007/s00355-007-0278-4zbMath1163.91341OpenAlexW2066386312MaRDI QIDQ1024769

Patrick Hummel

Publication date: 17 June 2009

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170808-134301462

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of graph theory (05C90) Voting theory (91B12)

Related Items

Iterated Elimination of Weakly Dominated Strategies in Well-Founded Games

Cites Work

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