The exact bias of the Banzhaf measure of power when votes are neither equiprobable nor independent
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Publication:1024771
DOI10.1007/s00355-007-0280-xzbMath1163.91343OpenAlexW2054890293MaRDI QIDQ1024771
Publication date: 17 June 2009
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-007-0280-x
Related Items (10)
Fair representation and a linear Shapley rule ⋮ A note on the direct democracy deficit in two-tier voting ⋮ Bounds on the competence of a homogeneous jury ⋮ How Often Are You Decisive: an Enquiry About the Pivotality of Voting Rules ⋮ A Test of the Marginalist Defense of the Rational Voter Hypothesis Using Quantile Regression ⋮ Aggregation of correlated votes and Condorcet's jury theorem ⋮ Voting power: an information theory approach ⋮ Heuristic and exact solutions to the inverse power index problem for small voting bodies ⋮ An invariance result for homogeneous juries with correlated votes ⋮ Measuring voting power in games with correlated votes using Bahadur's parametrisation
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- The mathematics and statistics of voting power
- Fair Apportionment and the Banzhaf Index
- Probabilistic Voting Power in the EU Council: The Cases of Trade Policy and Social Regulation
- Multilinear Extensions of Games
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