Strategic interactions among central bank and national fiscal authorities in a monetary union subject to asymmetric country shocks

DOI10.1007/S11079-007-9065-1zbMath1163.91497OpenAlexW2034081863MaRDI QIDQ1025592

Valeria De Bonis, Pompeo Della Posta

Publication date: 19 June 2009

Published in: Open Economies Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11079-007-9065-1

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64)

Cites Work

• ``Set a sufficiently ambitious budget target and let the automatic stabilizers work. Will it really work in the European Monetary Union?
• Monetary and fiscal policy interaction and government debt stabilization

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