Consulting an expert with potentially conflicting preferences

DOI10.1007/s11238-007-9070-2zbMath1213.91054OpenAlexW2075303355MaRDI QIDQ1025630

Thomas Lanzi, Jérôme Mathis

Publication date: 19 June 2009

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://publications.ut-capitole.fr/2313/1/cepcp.pdf

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Individual preferences (91B08)

Related Items (3)

How to consult an expert? Opinion versus evidence ⋮ A characterization of equilibrium set of persuasion games with binary actions ⋮ Full revelation of information in sender-receiver games of persuasion

Cites Work

• Full revelation of information in sender-receiver games of persuasion
• The burden of proof in a game of persuasion
• Information transmission when the sender's preferences are uncertain.
• Persuasion games with higher-order uncertainty.
• Eliciting information from multiple experts
• Robust inference in communication games with partial provability
• Secrecy, two-sided bias and the value of evidence
• Strategic Information Revelation
• Strategic Information Transmission with Verifiable Messages

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