How risk disciplines pre-commitment
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Publication:1025632
DOI10.1007/s11238-007-9085-8zbMath1165.91006OpenAlexW4300067802MaRDI QIDQ1025632
Christophe Caron, Thierry Lafay
Publication date: 19 June 2009
Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-007-9085-8
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Cites Work
- Cournot duopoly with two production periods
- Endogenous timing in duopoly games: Stackelberg or Cournot equilibria
- The values of information in some nonzero sum games
- Endogenous Stackelberg leadership
- Firm scale and the endogenous timing of entry: A choice between commitment and flexibility
- The Strategic Role of Information on the Demand Function in an Oligopolistic Market
- Uncertainty, Instability, Expected Profit
- Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model
- Secret information acquisition in Cournot markets
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