Monotonicity of power in games with a priori unions

DOI10.1007/s11238-008-9114-2zbMath1163.91337OpenAlexW2025176001MaRDI QIDQ1025646

C. Bowles, Stefan Napel, José M. Alonso-Meijide, Manfred J. Holler

Publication date: 19 June 2009

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-008-9114-2

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Voting theory (91B12)

Related Items (4)

Stable coalition structures in symmetric majority games: a coincidence between myopia and farsightedness ⋮ Dynamic programming for computing power indices for weighted voting games with precoalitions ⋮ A Review of Some Recent Results on Power Indices ⋮ Monotonicity of power in weighted voting games with restricted communication

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