Markov interactions in a class of dynamic games
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Publication:1025647
DOI10.1007/s11238-008-9123-1zbMath1163.91325OpenAlexW2000849271MaRDI QIDQ1025647
Publication date: 19 June 2009
Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://hal.inrae.fr/hal-02825085/file/DR2004-16_1.pdf
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