Two-sided matching with spatially differentiated agents

DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2009.03.002zbMath1164.91045OpenAlexW1984158177MaRDI QIDQ1026251

Tilman Klumpp

Publication date: 24 June 2009

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2009.03.002

zbMATH Keywords

stable marriage problemspatial heterogeneitybilateral exchangetwo-sided matchingassignment game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Matching models (91B68)

Cites Work

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• On the uniqueness of stable marriage matchings
• The assignment game. I: The core
• Monotone Matching in Perfect and Imperfect Worlds
• Assortative Matching and Search
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage

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