On the foundation of stability
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Publication:1028547
DOI10.1007/s00199-008-0363-7zbMath1185.91050OpenAlexW2081143019MaRDI QIDQ1028547
Publication date: 6 July 2009
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-008-0363-7
Cooperative games (91A12) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Decision theory for games (91A35)
Related Items (5)
On stability of economic networks ⋮ An indistinguishability result on rationalizability under general preferences ⋮ Cooperative Games (Von Neumann-Morgenstern Stable Sets) ⋮ The foundation of stability in extensive games with perfect information ⋮ The von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets for the mixed extension of \(2\times 2\) games
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