Coalitional strategy-proofness and fairness
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Publication:1028549
DOI10.1007/s00199-008-0366-4zbMath1166.91005OpenAlexW1964887069MaRDI QIDQ1028549
Publication date: 6 July 2009
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-008-0366-4
Cooperative games (91A12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Matching models (91B68)
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