Coalitional strategy-proofness and fairness

DOI10.1007/s00199-008-0366-4zbMath1166.91005OpenAlexW1964887069MaRDI QIDQ1028549

Lars-Gunnar Svensson

Publication date: 6 July 2009

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-008-0366-4

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Matching models (91B68)

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