Secrecy and fairness in plea bargaining with multiple defendants

DOI10.1007/s00712-008-0047-6zbMath1166.91013OpenAlexW2021504129MaRDI QIDQ1028682

Jeong-Yoo Kim

Publication date: 6 July 2009

Published in: Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-008-0047-6

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items

Accomplice plea bargains in the presence of costly juror effort

Cites Work

• Signal jamming in pretrial negotiation with multiple defendants
• Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games
• The Evolution of Conventions
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