An economist's perspective on multi-agent learning

DOI10.1016/j.artint.2006.11.006zbMath1168.68461OpenAlexW2152916053MaRDI QIDQ1028920

David K. Levine, Drew Fudenberg

Publication date: 9 July 2009

Published in: Artificial Intelligence (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:3200613

zbMATH Keywords

machine learninglearning in gamesmulti-agent learning

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Learning and adaptive systems in artificial intelligence (68T05) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

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