Learning equilibrium as a generalization of learning to optimize

DOI10.1016/j.artint.2007.01.002zbMath1168.68482OpenAlexW2019367623MaRDI QIDQ1028933

Moshe Tennenholtz, Dov Monderer

Publication date: 9 July 2009

Published in: Artificial Intelligence (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.artint.2007.01.002

zbMATH Keywords

learningmachine learninglearning equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Learning and adaptive systems in artificial intelligence (68T05) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Efficient learning equilibrium
• If multi-agent learning is the answer, what is the question?
• Two-terminal routing games with unknown active players
• Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies
• Bundling equilibrium in combinatorial auctions
• Learning in extensive-form games. I: Self-confirming equilibria
• Payoff information and self-confirming equilibrium
• Rational Learning Leads to Nash Equilibrium
• Subjective Equilibrium in Repeated Games
• Multistage Games with Communication
• An Approach to Communication Equilibria
• Self-Confirming Equilibrium

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