Optimal auctions for asymmetrically budget constrained bidders

DOI10.1007/s10058-008-0051-xzbMath1165.91385OpenAlexW2027701916MaRDI QIDQ1029531

Rakesh V. Vohra, Alexey Malakhov

Publication date: 13 July 2009

Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/math/papers/1419.pdf

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (8)

Endogenous budget constraints ⋮ Endogenous budget constraints in auctions ⋮ Optimal dynamic mechanism design with deadlines ⋮ Optimal auctions with financially constrained buyers ⋮ Selling mechanisms for a financially constrained buyer ⋮ Optimal and efficient mechanisms with asymmetrically budget constrained buyers ⋮ Asymmetric budget constraints in a first-price auction ⋮ A near Pareto optimal auction with budget constraints

Cites Work

• Simultaneous ascending auctions with complementarities and known budget constraints
• Optimal auction with financially constrained buyers
• Expected revenue of all-pay auctions and first-price sealed-bid auctions with budget constraints
• The optimal mechanism for selling to a budget-constrained buyer
• Optimal Auction Design
• Ironing, Sweeping, and Multidimensional Screening
• High bids and broke winners

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