Differentiable strategy-proof mechanisms for private and public goods in domains that are not necessarily large or quasi-linear

DOI10.1007/S10058-008-0060-9zbMath1165.91368OpenAlexW1986765409MaRDI QIDQ1029534

Publication date: 13 July 2009

Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10016/3544

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Public goods (91B18)

Related Items (2)

A Hurwicz type result in a model with public good production ⋮ Non fixed-price trading rules in single-crossing classical exchange economies

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