Coordinating under incomplete information

DOI10.1007/S10058-008-0061-8zbMath1165.91334OpenAlexW1980614375MaRDI QIDQ1029535

Seung Han Yoo, Geir B. Asheim

Publication date: 13 July 2009

Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www.sv.uio.no/econ/english/research/unpublished-works/working-papers/pdf-files/2007/Memo-22-2007.pdf

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Economics of information (91B44)

Cites Work

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• Nash equilibrium with strategic complementarities
• Noisy equilibrium selection in coordination games
• Equilibrium selection in global games with strategic complementarities.
• Monotone equilibria in Bayesian games of strategic complementarities
• Efficient and Nearly-Efficient Partnerships
• Global Games and Equilibrium Selection
• Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complementarities
• Equilibrium Points in Nonzero-Sum n-Person Submodular Games
• Single Crossing Properties and the Existence of Pure Strategy Equilibria in Games of Incomplete Information
• Minimum-effort coordination games: Stochastic potential and logit equilibrium

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