Goodman's ``new riddle

DOI10.1007/s10992-008-9083-5zbMath1175.03004OpenAlexW2064513343MaRDI QIDQ1029826

Branden Fitelson

Publication date: 13 July 2009

Published in: Journal of Philosophical Logic (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10992-008-9083-5

zbMATH Keywords

BayesCarnapconfirmation theoryGoodmangrue paradoxHempel

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Philosophical and critical aspects of logic and foundations (03A05) Probability and inductive logic (03B48) Logic in the philosophy of science (03A10)

Related Items (3)

Revamping hypothetico-deductivism: A dialectic account of confirmation ⋮ Evidence, hypothesis, and grue ⋮ Unity as an epistemic virtue

Cites Work

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• Probabilities for multiple properties: The models of Hesse and Carnap and Kemeny
• Likelihoodism, Bayesianism, and relational confirmation
• How Bayesian Confirmation Theory Handles the Paradox of the Ravens
• Some theorems in the metric theory of diophantine approximation
• I.—STUDIES IN THE LOGIC OF CONFIRMATION (I.)
• A purely syntactical definition of confirmation

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