Monotonicity and Nash implementation in matching markets with contracts
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Publication:1031836
DOI10.1007/s00199-008-0399-8zbMath1180.91210OpenAlexW2120452336MaRDI QIDQ1031836
Claus-Jochen Haake, Bettina Klaus
Publication date: 23 October 2009
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://cris.maastrichtuniversity.nl/ws/files/1699144/guid-c4fb4967-c89c-4203-8389-27224bf6e053-ASSET1.0.pdf
Related Items (8)
An analysis of the German university admissions system ⋮ Take-it-or-leave-it contracts in many-to-many matching markets ⋮ Contract design and stability in many-to-many matching ⋮ Nash implementation of competitive equilibria in the job-matching market ⋮ Stability and Nash implementation in matching markets with couples ⋮ An impossibility theorem for matching problems ⋮ A note on strategy-proofness from the doctor side in matching with contracts ⋮ Nash implementation in private good economies with single-plateaued preferences and in matching problems
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