Plurality rule works in three-candidate elections

DOI10.1007/s11238-007-9063-1zbMath1183.91045OpenAlexW1980518899MaRDI QIDQ1036097

Bernardo Moreno, M. Socorro Puy

Publication date: 4 November 2009

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-007-9063-1

zbMATH Keywords

plurality ruleCondorcet winnersincere votingcitizen-candidate

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

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Cites Work

• Explaining all three-alternative voting outcomes
• Condorcet efficiency of simple voting rules for large electorates
• The scoring rules in an endogenous election
• Spatial Equilibrium with Entry
• An Economic Model of Representative Democracy
• Strategic Candidacy and Voting Procedures
• A Model of Political Competition with Citizen-Candidates