Expected utility consistent extensions of preferences

DOI10.1007/s11238-007-9066-yzbMath1186.91097OpenAlexW2089617750MaRDI QIDQ1036099

Burak Can, M. Remzi Sanver, Bora Erdamar

Publication date: 4 November 2009

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-007-9066-y

zbMATH Keywords

strategy-proofnessexpected utility consistencypreferences over sets

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Utility theory (91B16) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (7)

A general impossibility result on strategy-proof social choice hyperfunctions ⋮ Arrovian impossibilities in aggregating preferences over non-resolute outcomes ⋮ Sincerity and manipulation under approval voting ⋮ A characterization of superdictatorial domains for strategy-proof social choice functions ⋮ Bargaining through approval ⋮ Choosers as extension axioms ⋮ Ranking Sets of Objects: The Complexity of Avoiding Impossibility Results

Cites Work

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• Strategic manipulation in voting games when lotteries and ties are permitted
• Manipulation of social choice functions
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• Strategic manipulability without resoluteness or shared beliefs: Gibbard-Satterthwaite generalized
• Even-chance lotteries in social choice theory
• Multi-valued strategy-proof social choice rules
• Sets of alternatives as Condorcet winners
• Strategy-Proofness and Social Choice Functions without Singlevaluedness
• The Manipulation of Social Choice Mechanisms that Do Not Leave "Too Much" to Chance

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