Price signaling and the strategic benefits of price rigidities

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2009.03.005zbMath1180.91143OpenAlexW3123648455MaRDI QIDQ1036565

Fabrizio Adriani, Luca G. Deidda

Publication date: 13 November 2009

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2009.03.005

zbMATH Keywords

signalingprice rigiditiestwo-sided asymmetric informationmarket for lemonsmarket breakdownprofessional bodies

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Economics of information (91B44)

Related Items

Price signaling with salient-thinking consumers, Signalling, information and consumer fraud, Price signaling and the strategic benefits of price rigidities, The market for lemons and information theory

Cites Work

• Does competitive pricing cause market breakdown under extreme adverse selection?
• Price signaling and the strategic benefits of price rigidities
• Belief-based refinements in signalling games
• Perfect sequential equilibrium
• A scent of lemon -- seller meets buyer with a noisy quality observation
• Auction and the informed seller problem
• Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
• The Value of Public Information in Monopoly
• Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivation
• Arm's Length Relationships