Consistency of beliefs and epistemic conditions for Nash and correlated equilibria

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2009.02.003zbMath1180.91019OpenAlexW2053135669MaRDI QIDQ1036567

Paulo Barelli

Publication date: 13 November 2009

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2009.02.003

zbMATH Keywords

common knowledgecommon prior assumptionuniversal beliefs spaceepistemic conditions for equilibria

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

Related Items (13)

Behavior and deliberation in perfect-information games: Nash equilibrium and backward induction ⋮ Weakly rational expectations ⋮ Lexicographic agreeing to disagree and perfect equilibrium ⋮ Robustness of equilibrium in the Kyle model of informed speculation ⋮ Two definitions of correlated equilibrium ⋮ The cycles approach ⋮ Pairwise epistemic conditions for Nash equilibrium ⋮ Correlated-belief equilibrium ⋮ Common priors under endogenous uncertainty ⋮ Generalized Nash equilibrium without common belief in rationality ⋮ From posteriors to priors via cycles ⋮ PEOPLE WITH COMMON PRIORS CAN AGREE TO DISAGREE ⋮ Consistent beliefs in extensive form games

Cites Work

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