Games played in a contracting environment

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2008.12.004zbMath1188.91078OpenAlexW2158632049MaRDI QIDQ1036569

J. Blot

Publication date: 13 November 2009

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2008.12.004

zbMATH Keywords

perfect complementsmarginal contributionsmulti-party contractingperfect substitutes

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (2)

Commitment and observability in a contracting environment ⋮ Commitment without reputation: renegotiation-proof contracts under asymmetric information

Cites Work

• A folk theorem for one-shot Bertrand games
• Commitment and observability in a contracting environment
• Discontinuous Games and Endogenous Sharing Rules
• Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation, and Economic Influence
• Observable Contracts: Strategic Delegation and Cooperation
• Contracting with Externalities
• Unobserved Delegation
• Strategic Delegation By Unobservable Incentive Contracts
• The Existence of Subgame-Perfect Equilibrium in Continuous Games with Almost Perfect Information: A Case for Public Randomization
• Competing Vertical Structures: Precommitment and Renegotiation
• Equilibrium Refinement for Infinite Normal-Form Games
• Games Played Through Agents
• Endogenous Games and Mechanisms: Side Payments Among Players

This page was built for publication: Games played in a contracting environment