Anonymous yes-no voting with abstention and multiple levels of approval

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2008.09.035zbMath1188.91060OpenAlexW2064757311MaRDI QIDQ1036572

Josep Freixas, William S. Zwicker

Publication date: 13 November 2009

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2008.09.035

zbMATH Keywords

abstentionanonymity(\(j,k)\) gamesabsolute and simple strict majority rulegames with several levels of approvalgrading systems

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

Related Items (23)

On anonymous and weighted voting systems ⋮ Achievable hierarchies in voting games with abstention ⋮ The inverse problem for power distributions in committees ⋮ On Dedekind's problem for complete simple games ⋮ Consistency without neutrality in voting rules: When is a vote an average? ⋮ Round-robin political tournaments: abstention, truthful equilibria, and effective power ⋮ On weights and quotas for weighted majority voting games ⋮ Complete voting systems with two classes of voters: weightedness and counting ⋮ Political influence in multi-choice institutions: cyclicity, anonymity, and transitivity ⋮ Manipulation in games with multiple levels of output ⋮ The influence relation for ternary voting games ⋮ Games with Multiple Alternatives Applied to Voting Systems ⋮ Quaternary dichotomous voting rules ⋮ Quota rules for incomplete judgments ⋮ Probabilistic power indices for voting rules with abstention ⋮ A policy-based rationalization of collective rules: dimensionality, specialized houses, and decentralized authority ⋮ A parameterization for a class of complete games with abstention ⋮ Dichotomous multi-type games with a coalition structure ⋮ Weighted voting procedure having a unique blocker ⋮ Anonymity, monotonicity, and quota pair systems ⋮ Amplitude of weighted representation of voting games with several levels of approval ⋮ A non-parametric approach to testing the axioms of the Shapley value with limited data ⋮ SOME OPEN PROBLEMS IN SIMPLE GAMES

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