Evolutionary stability of discrimination under observability

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2009.03.010zbMath1188.91036OpenAlexW3121742223MaRDI QIDQ1036581

Christoph Kuzmics, Florian Herold

Publication date: 13 November 2009

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2009.03.010

zbMATH Keywords

stabilityobservabilityevolution of preferencesdiscrimination

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Related Items (7)

Evolutionary stability of preferences: altruism, selfishness, and envy ⋮ Evolutionary game theory: a renaissance ⋮ Promises and endogenous reneging costs ⋮ Labelling, homophily and preference evolution ⋮ The co-evolution of reciprocity-based wage offers and effort choices ⋮ Equilibrium selection and the dynamic evolution of preferences ⋮ Coevolution of deception and preferences: Darwin and Nash meet Machiavelli

Cites Work

• A commitment folk theorem
• Evolutionary stability in repeated games played by finite automata
• Evolution of interdependent preferences in aggregative games
• The strategic advantage of negatively interdependent preferences.
• Neutrally stable outcomes in cheap-talk coordination games
• An evolutionary approach to explaining cooperative behavior by reciprocal incentives
• The dynamic evolution of preferences
• Evolutionary Drift and Equilibrium Selection
• Evolution of Preferences1
• On the evolution of individualistic preferences: An incomplete information scenario
• Nash equilibrium and the evolution of preferences
• Preference evolution and reciprocity

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