A glove-market partitioned matrix related to the assignment game

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2009.03.014zbMath1189.91022OpenAlexW1964230617MaRDI QIDQ1036587

Marina Núñez, Carles Rafels

Publication date: 13 November 2009

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2009.03.014

zbMATH Keywords

corenucleolusassignment gameexact gameglove market

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (3)

Von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets of a patent licensing game: the existence proof ⋮ A survey on assignment markets ⋮ Von Neumann-Morgenstern solutions in the assignment market

Cites Work

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• The Shapley value of exact assignment games
• On the dimension of the core of the assignment game
• On the reduced game property and its converse
• An algorithm for finding the nucleolus of assignment games
• Assignment games with stable core
• Buyer-seller exactness in the assignment game
• A note on the nucleolus and the kernel of the assignment game
• A note on the inclusion of the kernel in the core of the bilateral assignment game
• A simple procedure to obtain the extreme core allocations of an assignment market
• The assignment game. I: The core
• The Böhm-Bawerk horse market: a cooperative analysis
• Geometric Properties of the Kernel, Nucleolus, and Related Solution Concepts
• The Nucleolus of a Characteristic Function Game
• The kernel of a cooperative game

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