A glove-market partitioned matrix related to the assignment game
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Publication:1036587
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2009.03.014zbMath1189.91022OpenAlexW1964230617MaRDI QIDQ1036587
Publication date: 13 November 2009
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2009.03.014
Cooperative games (91A12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
Related Items (3)
Von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets of a patent licensing game: the existence proof ⋮ A survey on assignment markets ⋮ Von Neumann-Morgenstern solutions in the assignment market
Cites Work
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- The Shapley value of exact assignment games
- On the dimension of the core of the assignment game
- On the reduced game property and its converse
- An algorithm for finding the nucleolus of assignment games
- Assignment games with stable core
- Buyer-seller exactness in the assignment game
- A note on the nucleolus and the kernel of the assignment game
- A note on the inclusion of the kernel in the core of the bilateral assignment game
- A simple procedure to obtain the extreme core allocations of an assignment market
- The assignment game. I: The core
- The Böhm-Bawerk horse market: a cooperative analysis
- Geometric Properties of the Kernel, Nucleolus, and Related Solution Concepts
- The Nucleolus of a Characteristic Function Game
- The kernel of a cooperative game
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