On core stability, vital coalitions, and extendability

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2009.01.005zbMath1192.91023OpenAlexW2074128812MaRDI QIDQ1036591

Evan Shellshear, Peter Sudhölter

Publication date: 13 November 2009

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2009.01.005

zbMATH Keywords

stable setcoreextendabilityTU gamevital coalition

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items (7)

A NOTE ON CHARACTERIZING CORE STABILITY WITH FUZZY GAMES ⋮ Von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets of a patent licensing game: the existence proof ⋮ Accessibility and stability of the coalition structure core ⋮ Characterization of TU games with stable cores by nested balancedness ⋮ Characterization sets for the nucleolus in balanced games ⋮ An optimal bound to access the core in TU-games ⋮ Autonomous coalitions

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• Totally Balanced Games and Games of Flow
• Algorithmic Aspects of the Core of Combinatorial Optimization Games
• Core Stability of Minimum Coloring Games
• Matching Games: The Least Core and the Nucleolus

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