On core stability, vital coalitions, and extendability
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1036591
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2009.01.005zbMath1192.91023OpenAlexW2074128812MaRDI QIDQ1036591
Evan Shellshear, Peter Sudhölter
Publication date: 13 November 2009
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2009.01.005
Related Items (7)
A NOTE ON CHARACTERIZING CORE STABILITY WITH FUZZY GAMES ⋮ Von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets of a patent licensing game: the existence proof ⋮ Accessibility and stability of the coalition structure core ⋮ Characterization of TU games with stable cores by nested balancedness ⋮ Characterization sets for the nucleolus in balanced games ⋮ An optimal bound to access the core in TU-games ⋮ Autonomous coalitions
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Cooperative games with large cores
- Prosperty properties of TU-games
- Large cores and exactness
- Assignment games with stable core
- Cores of convex games
- The assignment game. I: The core
- Cores of exact games. I
- The modiclus and core stability
- Core Stability of Flow Games
- Algorithms for Core Stability, Core Largeness, Exactness, and Extendability of Flow Games
- Totally Balanced Games and Games of Flow
- Algorithmic Aspects of the Core of Combinatorial Optimization Games
- Core Stability of Minimum Coloring Games
- Matching Games: The Least Core and the Nucleolus
This page was built for publication: On core stability, vital coalitions, and extendability