Discretionary rewards as a feedback mechanism

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2009.03.002zbMath1190.91085OpenAlexW2050292010MaRDI QIDQ1036595

Jeroen van de Ven, Anton Suvorov

Publication date: 13 November 2009

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2009.03.002

zbMATH Keywords

feedbackmoral hazarddiscretionary rewardsself confidencesubjective performance

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economics of information (91B44) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (2)

Monitored by your friends, not your foes: strategic ignorance and the delegation of real authority ⋮ Communicating subjective evaluations

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