Reputational cheap talk with misunderstanding

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2009.03.001zbMath1188.91042OpenAlexW3023477050MaRDI QIDQ1036601

Alexander Guembel, Silvia Rossetto

Publication date: 13 November 2009

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://publications.ut-capitole.fr/3147/1/guembel_rossetto.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

communicationnoisecheap talkreputational concerns

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Cites Work

• Professional advice
• Strategic Information Transmission
• Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective

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